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1 | INTRODUCTION
Debt creation is an important mechanism of the capitalist system as it allows states, firms and
households to hedge against unanticipated economic shocks. Unanticipated shocks typically arise
due to the time-inconsistent nature of demand and supply. Thus, debt creation is a pathway for
economic agents towards expenditure smoothing, price stability and long-term economic growth
(Cecchetti, Mohanty, & Zampolli, 2011, pp. 2–3). In spite of its obvious theoretical advantages,
many studies have disputed the positive effects of debt expansion on growth. For example, Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2010) find that there is little or no correlation between public debt and growth
when the public debt to GDP ratio is below the threshold level of 90%. They also find that above
this threshold, the association turns strongly negative.
Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), many other scholars have engaged in exploring the public
debt–growth relationship, see, for example, Baum, Checherita-Westphal, and Rother (2013), Cec-
chetti et al. (2011), Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013), and Pres-
bitero (2012).1 Some studies analyse the effect of private debt on growth (Beck, B€uy€ukkarabacak,
Rioja, & Valev, 2012; Cecchetti et al., 2011), while others assess the possibility of reverse causation
from debt to growth (Lof & Malinen, 2014; Puente-Ajovın & Sanso-Navarro, 2015) and whether the
relationship is conditional on the country’s level of GDP (Caner et al. 2010; Woo & Kumar, 2015).
In this study, we aim to systematically analyse the effect of debt on economic growth. We
unbundle debt into public and private debt. We further disaggregate private debt into household
and nonfinancial corporation (NFC) debt. We also account for the effect of total debt (i.e., the sum
of public, household and NFC debt) on growth. We address the issue of potential reverse causation
by estimating our model using the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) approach. We also investi-
gate potential heterogeneity in the relationship between debt and growth across developed and
developing countries which yields new results. Our paper exploits a panel data set of 48 countries
over the period 1961–2015. The data on our main variable of interest, debt, are sourced from
Vague (2014).
Our contribution in this paper is threefold. First, we present a coherent empirical framework to
estimate the growth effects of public versus private and corporate versus household debt. By
1Egert (2015) and Panizza and Presbitero (2013) present excellent reviews of this literature.
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dividing our sample into developed and developing countries, we are able to estimate the heteroge-
neous effects of debt on growth across countries. Second, we estimate our model using the PVAR
approach which successfully tackles the issue of endogeneity in this literature. Finally, we bring in
new data from Vague (2014) and estimate the growth effect of total debt which yields new result.
Our key findings are as follows. First, debt appears to be harmful to growth in general for the
full sample of countries. In particular, our estimates reveal that public debt, private debt, household
debt and corporate debt are all associated with lower rates of economic growth. Second, the nega-
tive effect of public debt appears to be uniform across developed and developing countries. This
however is not the case when it comes to private and total debt. The negative growth effects of
private and total debt appear to be mainly restricted to developed countries. Further disaggregation
of private debt into household and NFC debt reveals some more new results. Household debt in
developing countries appears to be growth facilitating while the same in developed countries hin-
ders growth. Non-financial corporate debt does not seem to matter much for growth in developing
countries, whereas it hinders growth in developed countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the existing lit-
erature. In particular, we discuss recent evidence on the relationship between public debt and econ-
omic growth. This is followed by a discussion of the literature on private debt and growth.
Section 3 introduces the empirical model. Section 4 presents the estimation results, and section 5
concludes.
2 | THE DEBT AND GROWTH LITERATURE
On the theoretical side, the conventional, neoclassical view on public debt is that regardless of any
short-term positive impact on demand and output, an increase in public debt has a negative long-
term impact on economic growth as it crowds out investments. Thus, the relationship between pub-
lic debt and economic growth is negative. Under this paradigm, fiscal deficits and subsequent
increase in public debt could have a positive impact on output if and only if there is excess capac-
ity in an economy (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999). This conventional view however has been criti-
cised for its neglect of case-specific economic conditions and context. In particular, they said
paradigm ignores the issue of the quality of debt spending. For instance, Checherita-Westphal and
Rother (2012) argue that debt has a growth-enhancing effect when debt is issued to finance public
investments. DeLong and Summers (2012) argue that in case of protracted recessions, fiscal defi-
cits and public debt might have a positive effect both in the short and long term. In a similar vein,
Greiner (2013) argue that in the presence of wage rigidities and unemployment, an economy with
a higher debt to GDP ratio is more likely to achieve higher balanced growth rate.2
On the empirical side, after Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) there has been a surge in research
aimed at assessing the relationship between public debt and economic growth. Examples of such
studies are Baum et al. (2013), Cecchetti et al. (2011), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012),
Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), Egert (2015), Kourtellos et al. (2013), Lof and Malinen (2014),
Panizza and Presbitero (2013), Presbitero (2012), Puente-Ajovın and Sanso-Navarro (2015) and
Woo and Kumar (2015). Although the majority of the existing studies seem to find negative corre-
lation between public debt and growth, their interpretation of the correlation varies. For instance,
with regard to advanced economies, Panizza and Presbitero (2013, p. 4) argue that although there
is evidence that “debt may have a negative effect on growth . . . the effect is likely to be small . . .
2For a recent review of this literature, see Panizza and Presbitero (2013) and Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2015).
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[T]he link between debt and growth depends on many cyclical and structural factors.” In contrast,
Kourtellos et al. (2013) argue that the impact of public debt on growth is conditional on the qual-
ity of domestic institutions. Lof and Malinen (2014) argue that the negative correlation between
public debt and growth is due to a significant reverse effect of growth on debt (i.e., increasing
growth has a negative impact on debt), while Egert (2015) presents results that challenge the nega-
tive non-linear relationship between public debt and economic growth altogether.
With regard to private debt, the theory and empirical evidence are relatively scarce and marked
by the division between mainstream and heterodox economics. Heterodox economists have long
called for more attention on private debt as a source of economic instability and crisis, and have
criticised the unsustainability of credit-fuelled growth patterns and the negative implications of
excessive financialisation. For instance, Keen (2009, 2017), from a post-Keynesian perspective,
has illustrated the critical role private debt played in the creation of the global financial crisis, and
the radical unsustainability generated by the existing debt-based economic model. Crouch (2009),
from an international political economy perspective, has argued that in the post-cold war period,
private debt has replaced the role that public debt played in the Keynesian paradigm. A number of
Marxian political economists have argued that private debt came to fill in the gap left from the
falling real income of the great majority of the population in advanced economies (Harvey, 2011).
The unsustainability of this debt-based economic model of modern economies has recently been
highlighted by many other economists (King, 2016; Mian & Sufi, 2014; Turner, 2016), as well as
researchers from the financial sector (Dobbs, Lund, Woetzel, & Mutafchieva, 2015; Roxburgh
et al., 2010; Vague, 2014). In spite of these recent advances, the overall theoretical inquiries into
the impact of private debt on growth remain rather underdeveloped.
The same applies for empirical studies in this domain.3 Some notable examples are as follows.
Cecchetti et al. (2011), focusing on 18 OECD countries for the period 1980–2010, find evidence
for a potential threshold of 90% and 85% of GDP for NFC and household debt, respectively,
beyond which debt becomes a drag on economic growth. Using a similar pool of countries,
Puente-Ajovın and Sanso-Navarro (2015) examine the possible presence of Granger causality
between private debt and growth. They find strong evidence that higher levels of private debt
Granger-cause slower growth, especially with regard to household debt. It is also worth mentioning
here that the scoreboard of indicators adopted by the EU in 2011 to monitor macroeconomic
imbalances includes a threshold of 133% of GDP for private sector debt. Beck et al. (2012) using
a data set of 45 developed and developing economies, for the period 1994–2005, find that NFC
debt is positively linked to GDP per capita growth (and reduction in income inequality), whereas
there is no significant relationship between household borrowing and GDP growth (or income
inequality). In a similar vein, Garcia-Escribano and Han (2015) focusing on 31 emerging markets
for the period 2002–12 find that increases in consumer, mortgage and NFC credit have significant
positive effects on real GDP growth, with the strongest impact coming from consumer credit.
In addition to the above, a literature also focuses on the heterogeneity of the debt-growth rela-
tionship between developed and developing countries. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) argue that the
public debt threshold of 90% in advanced economies apply to emerging markets too. In a panel of
24 emerging market economies over the period 1900–2009, they show that median GDP growth is
around 4%–4.5% for levels of debt below 90% of GDP, but falls to 2.9% for higher debt (p. 576).
Caner, Grennes, and Koehler-Geib (2010), using a large data set of both developed and developing
countries for the period 1980–2008, report a similar negative non-linear relationship between pub-
lic debt and growth for both groups of countries, but with significant differences in the debt
3For a brief review of this literature, see Beck et al. (2012) and Garcia-Escribano and Han (2015).
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threshold: 77% for developed and 64% for developing countries. Woo and Kumar (2015) also
reach similar conclusions. They also find that in countries that have a high portion of public debt
denominated in a foreign currency—a problem traditionally associated with developing economies
—the negative impact of increased debt on growth is much stronger.
In contrast, Abbas and Christensen (2010) focusing on a data set of 93 low-income and emerg-
ing markets for the period 1975–2004 find a robust positive linear relationship between public debt
and economic growth: with one standard deviation increase in public debt leading to a 0.1 standard
deviation increase in economic growth. They also find that the quality of domestic debt (whether it
is in marketable securities, positive real interest rates and debt issued to the non-bank sector) mat-
ters a great deal towards its impact on growth. Other notable studies reporting positive effects are
Egert (2015) and Fincke and Greiner (2015).
3 | EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
Our investigation focuses on an unbalanced panel of developed and developing countries. The
maximum coverage is 48 countries spanning over the years 1960–2015.4 We have included coun-
tries with data for at least 10 consecutive years. Table A1 presents the list of countries included in
our sample.
To assess the relationship between debt and economic growth, we estimate the following
model:
Growthit ¼ aþ bDebtit þ dt þ ui þ eit; (1)
where subscripts i and t represents country and time period, respectively, Growthit is the 1-year lag
difference of per capita real GDP (constant 2010 US$) for country i at time t, Debtit is the specific
indicator of debt also measured as lagged difference for country i at time t, dt and ui are the coun-
try and year fixed effects, and eit is the stochastic error term.
The growth impact of debt is revealed by the sign and significance of the coefficient b. A nega-
tive coefficient is indicative of an adverse effect of debt on economic growth. Conversely, a posi-
tive coefficient implies that higher levels of debt could be beneficial to growth.
For the sake of parsimony, we do not include any additional control variables in the main spec-
ification. However, we use 1-year lagged GDP to test the robustness of our results.
We consider both public and private debt, and the latter further divided into household and
NFC debt. We also focus on total debt, defined as the sum of public and private debt but exclud-
ing financial sector debt. All measures of debt are expressed as share of GDP.
A common challenge with an empirical model of this nature is potential reverse causation. If a
feedback effect is at work, the orthogonality condition between regressors and the error term would
not hold rendering the estimate b^ biased. Therefore, it is important to test empirically the two-way
relationship between debt and growth. We do this using a panel VAR methodology. In particular,
current values of growth and debt are allowed to depend on the past values of each other. We use
the following first-order panel VAR:
yit ¼ C0 þ C1yit1 þ Fi þ Eit; (2)
4We use the data set on debt compiled by Vague (2014). This data set is available at http://debt-economics.org/ and is based
on data from the World Bank, IMF, BIS and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) data set is available
at http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/.
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where yit is a two-variable vector including Growth and Debt. Fi and Eit are vectors of country-
fixed effects and idiosyncratic errors, respectively. Following estimation of model (2), we proceed
to run Granger causality tests and explore impulse response function.
Our basic model uses year-on-year changes which resembles Minsky and a Keynesian demand-
led growth framework (Bezemer, Grydaki, & Zhang, 2014; Minsky, 1957). Note that the Minsky
model focuses on endogenous business cycles as opposed to the neoclassical steady state growth
rates. Minsky models posit a negative effect of debt on growth and a positive effect of growth on
debt. Therefore, reverse causation should be an issue here which we tackle using PVAR. We also
do not include debt squared in the specification as the Minsky model does not stipulate a non-lin-
ear effect of debt.
4 | EVIDENCE
4.1 | Unbundled debt and economic growth
We open by examining the time-series properties of the key variables used in the paper. Table 1
displays the results of Fisher-type Augmented Dickey–Fuller unit-root tests. It is apparent from the
tests that all variables are I(1). Because our variables are measured as first difference, non-station-
arity is unlikely to be a problem here.
Note that we use a constant term and a time trend here while acknowledging that there is no
theoretical justification for preferring one specification over another. Nonetheless, we also check
our results by excluding the trend and our results remain unaffected. In Table 1, we use one lag
but we also rerun the test using up to three lags and the results are robust.
A common criticism of the Fisher-type augmented Dickey–Fuller panel unit-root test is that
they fail to take account of cross-sectional dependence. Following Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002), we
use the “demean” option which subtracts cross-sectional averages from the series to alleviate the
impact of cross-sectional dependence. Furthermore, we also run an additional panel unit-root test
proposed by Pesaran (2003) which is robust to cross-sectional. Again our I(1) result survives.
Since we estimate our model in first difference, are we ignoring the possibility of a long-run
cointegrating relationship between GDP and debt? Following Westerlund (2007), we test for long-
TABLE 1 Unit-root test
GDP Public debt Private debt
Inverse chi-squared 0.072 0.308 0.996
Inverse normal 0.119 0.806 1.000
Inverse logit t 0.129 0.764 0.999
Modified inv. chi-squared 0.066 0.322 0.992
Growth GDP Growth public debt Growth private debt
Inverse chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inverse normal 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inverse logit t 0.000 0.000 0.000
Modified inv. chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table illustrates the p-values from Fisher-type ADF unit-root test. Growth rates are measured in first differences. Each
line refers to a specific transformation used to combine the p-values form unit-root tests computed for each panel individually. Con-
stant and time trend term included.
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run cointegrating relationship between GDP and debt by running the panel and the mean group
statistics. We obtain the critical values through bootstrapping (100 replications) to control for
cross-sectional dependence. All tests indicate that GDP is not cointegrated with public debt and
private debt. Therefore, our choice of vector autoregression (VAR) model over a vector error cor-
rection mechanism (VECM) framework is entirely justified.
The estimation results related to model (1) are displayed in Table 2. As shown in column (1),
the coefficient estimate of public debt is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The
coefficient implies that a one percentage point increase in public debt reduces GDP growth by
0.02%. Results are qualitatively similar when we use private debt (column (2)) and its components,
namely household debt (column (3)) and NFC debt (column (4)) as explanatory variables. In
column (5), we aggregate public and private debt and find a negative and statistically significant
coefficient.
It is possible that our estimates are capturing a feedback effect from growth to debt rather than
an exclusive effect of debt on growth. To empirically assess the extent of feedback effect, we esti-
mate model (2) using the panel VAR approach. Note that under this methodology, we are not con-
cerned about the coefficient estimates per se. Instead, we are more interested in the direction of
causality. Therefore, following the estimation of model (2) we run Granger causality tests to check
the direction of causality between the variables under study. The p-values are displayed in Table 3.
We find that both public debt and private debt Granger-cause growth at the confidence level of 5%
(Column (1)). In contrast, neither public nor private debt Granger-causes growth. We further investi-
gate the causality issue through impulse response functions (IRFs). Figure 1 displays the response
over 10 years of growth to one-standard deviation shock on public debt. The black line denotes the
point estimates of the response, whereas the lighter bands are the 95 percentile confidence interval.
The growth impact of a shock in public debt is limited to 2 years, at most, but it is significantly differ-
ent from zero. Figure 2 depicts the response of public debt to one-standard deviation shock on
growth. The confidence intervals discard the possibility of reverse causation. A similar story holds for
private debt, as depicted in Figures 3 and 4. Overall, based on these estimates we are reasonably con-
fident that our cross-country estimates are not picking up a feedback effect from growth to debt.
So far our estimates suggest that debt, both public and private, is harmful to growth. However,
our estimates might conceal potential heterogeneity arising from a country’s level of economic
development. To account for such heterogeneity, we re-estimate model (1) separately for the











Debtt 0.020*** 0.010** 0.036*** 0.016*** 0.033***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,762 1,823 1,187 1,169 1,957
Countries 48 46 42 42 48
R2 .268 .253 .290 .302 .263
Notes: The table reports fixed effect estimates. Column (1) reports public debt. Column (2) reports private debt. Column (3) reports
household private debt. Column (4) reports private debt of nonfinancial corporations. Column (5) reports public and private debt. The
figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors with clustering at the country level. Constant and time dummies not reported.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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subsamples of developed and developing countries. Developed and developing countries are identi-
fied using the World Bank Country Income Classification.
As shown in Table 4 panel A, the coefficients associated with debt are always negative and sta-
tistically significant for developed countries. This is in line with the results for the overall sample
reported in Table 2. However, our estimate for the sample of developing countries (panel B) tells
a different story. Column (1) shows that public debt is harmful to growth, but the magnitude of
the negative coefficient is much smaller compared to the developed country subsample reported in
panel A. The effect of private debt is near zero and statistically insignificant (column (2)). House-
hold debt appears to be expansionary for developing countries (column (3)). This is in sharp con-
trast to the developed country sample where household debt is clearly contractionary. This is
perhaps indicative of the fact that household in developed countries is already overleveraged and
therefore further credit expansion harms growth. In contrast, households in developing countries
are relatively less leveraged and therefore credit expansion is expansionary. Unlike in the devel-
oped country sample, NFC and total debt do not seem to have a strong negative effect on growth
in developing countries.
TABLE 3 Debt and growth: Granger causality test
Impulse
Response




Notes: The table displays the p-value from the panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test. Column (1) reports the IRF, growth being
the response variable. Column (2) reports the IRF, public debt being the response variable. Column (3) reports the IRF, private debt
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FIGURE 1 Response of growth to shock in public debt
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4.2 | Robustness tests
We perform a battery of robustness tests of our key results. These are as follows.
Neoclassical growth stipulates that the empirical growth model should include the lagged level
of per capita GDP to account for “conditional convergence” (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). We
include lagged level of per capita GDP into our specification, and our key results remain
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FIGURE 3 Response of growth to shock in private debt
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Panel A: Developed countries
Debtt 0.038** 0.014*** 0.038*** 0.016*** 0.011***
(0.014) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,265 1,357 991 973 1,404
Countries 32 32 32 32 32
R2 .362 .334 .32 .355 .334
Panel B: Developing countries
Debtt 0.008*** 0.000 0.024** 0.009 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 497 466 196 196 553
Countries 16 14 10 10 16
R2 .333 .246 .378 .369 .243
Notes: The table reports fixed effect estimates. Column (1) reports public debt. Column (2) reports private debt. Column (3) reports
household private debt. Column (4) reports private debt of nonfinancial corporations. Column (5) reports public and private debt.
The figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors with clustering at the country level. Constant and time dummies not
reported.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Our estimates use annual data which by definition is noisy. Therefore, we re-estimate our mod-
els in Tables 2 and 4 using 5-year averages. Our results survive, and they are displayed in
Tables 5 and 6.









Debtt 0.037*** 0.011** 0.045* 0.025**
(0.009) (0.005) (0.027) (0.012)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 351 359 198 225
Countries 48 46 42 42
R2 .256 .131 .024 .087
Notes: The table reports fixed effect estimates. Column (1) reports public debt. Column (2) reports private debt. Column (3) reports
household private debt. Column (4) reports private debt of nonfinancial corporations. The figures in the parentheses are clustered
standard errors with clustering at the country level. Constant and time dummies not reported.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.









Panel A: Developed countries
Debtt 0.062*** 0.014** 0.061* 0.028**
(0.016) (0.006) (0.036) (0.012)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 254 267 159 187
Countries 32 32 32 32
R2 .318 .055 .048 .092
Panel B: Developing countries
Debtt 0.015*** 0.002 0.105** 0.010
(0.003) (0.006) (0.041) (0.013)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97 92 39 38
Countries 16 14 10 10
R2 .357 .066 .045 .026
Notes: The table reports fixed effect estimates. Column (1) reports public debt. Column (2) reports private debt. Column (3) reports
household private debt. Column (4) reports private debt of nonfinancial corporations. Column (5) reports public and private debt.
The figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors with clustering at the country level. Constant and time dummies not
reported.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Our results could be driven by the idiosyncratic nature of the Vague (2014) data set that
we use. To be confident that this is indeed not the case, we re-estimate models in Tables 2
and 4 using an alternative data set sourced from the World Bank. These results are reported in
Tables 7 and 8. Note that these tables are somewhat different from Tables 2 and 4 because
the debt variables are defined differently in the World Bank data set. The results however are
qualitatively similar to Tables 2 and 4. In particular, Table 7 shows that public debt, private
debt and external debt are harmful to growth for the overall sample of up to 177 countries.
However, public debt is less harmful in developing countries than in developed countries
(Table 8). As for private debt, the impact is negative for the developed countries but positive
for the developing countries.







Debtt 0.011** 0.007*** 0.004***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 823 6,958 4,021
Countries 49 177 115
R2 .187 .022 .047
Notes: The table reports Fixed Effect estimates. Column (1) reports central government debt. Column (2) reports domestic credit to
private sector provided by banks. Column (3) reports external debt stock. The figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors
with clustering at the country level. Constant and time dummies not reported.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 8 Debt and growth (WB)









Debtt 0.019** 0.017** 0.003** 0.002**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 398 2,155 424 4,750
Countries 21 54 28 123
R2 .309 .126 .183 .023
Notes: The table reports Fixed Effect estimates. Columns (1) and (3) reports central government debt. Columns (2) and (4) reports
domestic credit to private sector provided by banks. No results for external debt are reported as there are too few observations for
the sample of developed countries. The figures in the parentheses are clustered standard errors with clustering at the country level.
Constant and time dummies not reported.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our paper unbundles debt into several constituent subparts and analyses their effects on growth.
Public debt appears to harm growth in both developed and developing countries, although not to
the same degree. In contrast, private debt appears to have a negative impact on growth only in
developed countries. Household debt facilitates growth in developing countries, and this is con-
sistent with the relatively low leverage of households in these locations. Non-financial corpora-
tion debt harms growth in developed countries, whereas the effect is ambiguous and weak for
developing countries. In our full sample of countries, we find that public debt, private debt,
household debt and corporate debt are all harmful to growth. The results survive a battery of
robustness tests.
The above findings generate new insights in the empirical literature on debt and growth. Draw-
ing general policy conclusions from this exercise remains a challenge. Yet, two broader insights
are important. First, non-linearity appears to be a crucial issue here with results differing across
developed and developing countries. Therefore, local conditions should be a key pointer towards
fiscal and monetary policy which drives the quantity of public and private debt. Second, the
expansionary nature of household debt in developing countries should not be interpreted as a linear
relationship. Therefore, it is worth noting that the speed of household credit expansion and initial
conditions could very well be prime in determining the country specific effects. Needless to say
that such nuances are not captured by our reduced form model.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 List of countries
Developed countries (32) Developing countries (16)
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UAE, UK, USA
Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia,
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Romania,
Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey,
Ukraine
Notes: The table reports the largest sample of countries included in our study. The income classification is based on the World
Bank Atlas method.
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